

**Support to Israel:**  
**Path Dependent Institutions or the Hijacking of United States Policy by an  
Interest Group?**

“We must also defend ourselves against the lies and vilifications. Throughout history, the slanders against the Jewish people always preceded the physical assaults against them and were used to justify them.” *Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 22 March 2010 address at the annual AIPAC policy conference.*

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The United States (US) government (USG) consistently supports the Government of Israel, virtually regardless of their actions or its negative impact on US interests. For example, in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), Israel is mentioned twenty-one times. While many of these references are in conjunction with the Palestinians and the peace process, the NSS clearly states, “They include broad cooperation on a wide range of issues with our close friend, Israel, and an unshakable commitment to its security”. (United States Government, 2010). The United Kingdom, a key ally, is mentioned only once. China, a key competitor, is mentioned only nine times. Mexico, a state that arguably poses a clear and present danger to United States national security (McCaffrey, et al., 2011), is mentioned only four times.

Since Israel’s founding, the US has vetoed forty-two United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) critical of Israel (Mearsheimer, et al., 2007 p. 40) (see also Appendix B). Many Congressmen take clear pro-Israel stances, often at the expense of the peace process with the Palestinians. For example 91 Congressmen sponsored House Resolution 5501 (America Stands With Israel Act) (GovTrack, 2010). Why does the USG consistently support Israel and block condemnation and sanctions, even when respected international organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) clearly document Israeli violations of jus in bello, if not actual war crimes? For example, during the Israeli attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon, HRW documented over 1,100 civilian deaths, mostly from deliberate Israeli attacks or a flawed policy that treated all remaining people in the Israeli declared area of operations as combatants (2007).

Why does well over ten percent of the US foreign aid budget go to a country that is consistently in the top thirty states for per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (IMF)? Why did, as Figure 5 below shows, US aid to Israel not really materialize until the early 1970’s and then increase in the 1980’s.

Why does this tiny country on a largely desert strip of land, with few resources, occupy such an important place in the premier document on United States national security? Path Dependency Theory might suggest the US established historical linkages with Israel since its founding in 1947 that lock it into a “close friendship” with Israel. The thorny nature of the Arab-Israeli peace process and its importance to stability in the Middle East may be another reason. The association of Palestinians with terrorism may be another reason. Yet another reason may be Israeli manipulation of United States institutions to further its own ends and achieve this “close friendship” in attempt to improve its own security. The answer to this question is important as an “Israel right or wrong” policy may actually impede the peace process, degrade US national security, and violate ethical and moral principles on several levels.

With Israel again sounding the tocsin of war with Iran, these actions could drag the United States into another prolonged and costly conflict with little or no gain and divert critical resources from other key areas noted in the NSS.

While many analysts and political observers blame the American Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC) for exerting unwarranted influence on the USG, the reality is perhaps far more complex. Michael Thomas notes the current USG support of Israel is based on “a unique blend of presidential leadership, domestic policy in the United States, and events in the Middle East” (Thomas, 2007).

Mearsheimer and Walt allege the Israel Lobby (Mearsheimer, et al., 2007) manipulates US policy. Robert Lieberman’s response to Mearsheimer and Walt’s *The Israeli Lobby and the US*, however, takes a far more inclusive view of policy setting and takes Mearsheimer and Walt to task for weak arguments and focusing only on the lobbyists (Lieberman, 2009). Mearsheimer and Walt responded in a long rebuttal. They take the approach that AIPAC, as well as other pro-Israeli lobby groups, dominate USG policy towards Israel (Mearsheimer, et al., 2009). Thus, Mearsheimer and Walt can be seen as advocates of essentially an interest group-based approach in Figure 4 and Lieberman as an advocate of a more expansive model, as shown in Figure 3. In this respect, Lieberman and Thomas have similar approaches, even if the details differ.

If Lieberman and Thomas are correct, the USG support of Israel results from complex institutional dynamics similar to those developed by Terry Moe in his influential “Organizational Theory of the Organization from Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond” and other related works where he discusses the influence of interest groups on agency structure (Moe, 1990).

Interest groups alone, however, do not completely address the scenario Thomas discusses. If Thomas is correct, the president has a powerful role, perhaps something similar to the role Lewis discusses in *Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design*. Thomas, however, leaves out Congress. Does Congress exert a role in USG policy setting and direct actions? Clearly, it does. While Congress may not set specific policy, it can send policy preferences to the State Department and can influence State Department and Defense Department actions through both ex post and ex ante controls. For example, Congress controls the appropriation of funds to Israel. Likewise, they can send letters to the Secretary of State with policy ramifications.

These influences on policy can reinforce each other. For example, seventy-one senators sent a letter drafted by AIPAC to Secretary Rice concerning the responsibilities of friendly Arab states (Journal of Palestine Studies, 2008). A simple model or even the inter-related approach that Thomas notes does not cover the complexity of the situation. Thus, a more comprehensive framework to analyze policy making that builds on the strengths of Lewis, Moe, McCubbins, and others is required. It must be expanded to cover a broader institutional approach that includes path dependency and exogenous events in order to capture the dynamic interplay between multiple actors, some of which may be exogenous to the US.

With this framework, we can then examine the relevant data and institutional processes to determine whether Israel or the pro-Israeli lobby has undue influence on USG policy and actions

or whether the USG policy and actions stem from core institutional processes, norms and/or path dependency and punctuated equilibrium.

This paper will first build a framework for analysis that includes an institutional model. It will then review critical data pertinent to the question, such as historical events, congressional bills related to Israel, USG spending on Israel, and Israeli lobbying efforts. It will then analyze the data within the framework to answer the question, why does the USG continually support Israel even if this support is contrary to international opinions and potential ethics and moral violations?

### **Building the Framework**

The framework starts with the political control over the bureaucracy. The Department of State, which manages the day-to-day execution of foreign policy, is clearly part of the federal bureaucracy. As such, it is subject to political control from both Congress and the president.

Generally speaking, as issues become more complex and the information asymmetries between Congress and the agency increase, congressional control tends to decrease. Congress seeks to rectify this situation and enhance control through broad groups of ex ante and ex post controls, as well as defining the structure of the agency and its processes and procedures. The essence of the literature is to describe how Congress gains and maintains control over the bureaucracy, especially policy setting. Ex ante controls place constraints on the bureaucracy designed to control behavior and policy setting. They include controls such as process and budget constraints. Ex post controls control the bureaucracy through reporting, congressional hearings, and audits. For the purposes of this study, congressional controls must allow Congress to shape ongoing policy in the midst of a crisis or significant issue. In the case of the State Department, the critical committees are the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. These committees hold hearings and exercise many of the potential ex ante and ex post controls over the State Department.

Moe discusses both ex ante and ex post controls, with a new emphasis on ex ante control (Moe, Forthcoming in 2012). McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (collectively known as McNollgast) also discuss aspects of political control that are highly relevant to the situation (McCubbins, et al., 1989). Wood and Waterman also provide a discussion of political control over the bureaucracy (Waterman, 1991) and note policy monitoring would help offset some of the asymmetry of information between Congress and the bureaucracy. This information asymmetry is the root cause of many of the congressional-bureaucracy conflicts and congressional desire to place controls on the bureaucracy. Hook states: "Distrust of the State Department and its diplomatic milieu is deeply embedded in US political culture, never far beneath the surface in Congress, the White House, and other agencies of the executive branch." (Hook, 2003 p. 23). For example, Rondinelli cites House Committee on Foreign Relations to ensure oversight and control of developmental programs (Rondinelli, 1982).

Huber and Shipan provide an interesting study on congressional policy setting that takes into account presidential and agency preferences as well. They note that Congress implicitly sets policy preferences that recognize the power of presidential veto and the agencies. Congress understands that it cannot arbitrarily set policy and define structure with impunity (Huber, et al., 2002 p. 105). David Lewis continued the advocacy for presidential control over the bureaucracy. He makes the convincing point that the president is the only nationally elected official and is publicly held responsible for policy and performance (Lewis, 2003). While his work, like many others, focuses more on agency design than policy, he does note:

Agency design determines, among other things, the degree to which current and future political actors can change the direction of public policy by nonlegislative means. Some structural arrangements allow more control by political actors than others do. (Lewis, 2003 p. 3)

Of special note for this study is Lewis' observation, citing Canes-Wrone et al, that

These advantages [over Congress] are perhaps greatest in foreign policy, where the president exercises independent constitutional authority over foreign affairs and maintains the largest informational advantage of Congress. (Lewis, 2003 p. 74)

The president also has a significant policy role in foreign affairs. Jentleson bridges the policy and structure debate with a review of cognitive versus organizational theories. 'Cognitive' reflects the president's belief system, while 'organization' reflects the influence of bureaucracy. Rather than competing, however, he sees them as complementary (Jentleson, 1990). Perhaps more on the cognitive side, Plischke's analysis of the president at the "diplomat in chief" presents a complex picture of the president's role, power, and popularity in foreign affairs. He sums up his analysis:

As diplomats in chief they have propounded policy, undertaken extensive top-level communications with other world leaders, appointed dozens of special personal envoys and roving emissaries, and participated directly in conferral and negotiations. There can be little question that their diplomacy at the summit conditions their immediate image and their long-range prestige, and that these, in turn, are related to promoting peace. (Plischke, 1985)

As Jentleson notes, the realist school of international relations portrays decision-making as somewhat less important, as policy and decision makers respond to events in the external environment. What this view fails to take into account is that presidents and statesmen can shape the external environment as well as be shaped by it.

Interest groups are another factor in agency structure, control, and policy setting. Can interest groups in general and the "Israeli lobby" in particular shape policy outcomes or can they only help set agendas and frame the terms of a debate?

In spite of common opinion, the effect of interest groups and lobbying is debated in academic circles. Many debate whether interest groups can specifically dictate policy and government action. However, there does appear to be evidence that interest groups can shape agendas, influence policy and monitor policy implementation and execution. The degree of influence will

vary with the issue, the structure of the interest group and the structure, norms, and culture of the institution that it wants to lobby. Generally speaking, focused issue groups with a controlled structure will have more success in shaping agendas and influencing policy. In rare cases, as noted in a discussion of Moe below, they may even set agendas and design structure and policy.

Lowry and Gray's analysis is useful for both its analytical content as well the wealth of sources that it cites and weaves together. They argue that lobbying may not be quite as effective as many state (Lowery, et al., 2004). From their neopluralist perspective, they disagree with Olson's model of collection action problems (Olson, 1982) and agree with other authors that while Olson has a point, his concerns over free-riders and the difficulty of mustering group action may be overstated. From their research, they believe that interest groups can overcome the free-rider problem Olson discusses and effectively mobilize a group for specific purposes.

Likewise, Andrews and Edwards provide a treasure trove of literature review and a mixed record on interest groups. The authors employ a five-part framework that covers agenda setting, access to decision-making arenas, achieving favorable policies, monitoring and shaping implementation, and shifting the long-term priorities and resources of political institutions (Andrews, et al., 2004). They conclude the bulk of authors feel agenda setting is where advocacy groups make the greatest impact.

McCubbins' and Schwartz's concept of "fire alarms" (McCubbins, et al., 1984) is similar to the monitoring and shaping functions Andrews and Edwards discusses. Interest groups monitor agency policy and performance and pull a fire alarm by alerting Congress to actions that impact their interest. This monitoring activity can then lead into agenda setting and shaping policy implementation. Many authors agree that given the complexities of many issues, Congress cannot actively manage every issue and rely upon interest groups to monitor the issues and pull the fire alarm. This concept is a significant part of Mearsheimer and Walt's claim that the Israeli Lobby has excess influence on USG policy.

Moe addressed interest group policy implementation as well as agency formation and structure. His case study of the Consumer Product Safety Commission clearly shows the role of interest groups in both establishing and monitoring the commission (Moe, 1989). While Moe's analysis is about how interest groups can influence and shape agency structure, his thoughts can be easily extrapolated to policy issues, especially when joined to McCubbin and Schwartz's fire alarm. Structure and policy are intimately related and both reinforce the other.

With this understanding of the principal actors, let us now turn our attention to the impact of historical and current events on decision- and policy-making. Path dependency theory originated in economics, but is now fully embedded in political science. It states that future actions are correlated with past events and that where an organization has been influences where it can and will go. From an economic perspective, Stack and Gartland note, "The relative strength of this type of path-dependent analysis is in showing the dynamic evolution of an industry to a path of

sub-optimality” (Stack, et al., 2003). Spruyt and others note the observation is equally relevant to political science and path dependency is a recognized and accepted explanatory factor used in political science (Spruyt, 1994). It is a fundamental part of the historical institutionalism school, which is an integral part of this analysis and differs from a strict logical causal model.

Simplistically, the logical causal model can be viewed as a group of billiard balls. When the cue ball strikes another ball, it sets the ball motion along a route that can be fairly precisely defined given the speed and angle of the cue ball, and the characteristics of the table. It is also essentially the method astronomers use to infer an unseen body. They can measure the detected movements and then calculate the movements of the unseen body. A body in motion, when it is impacted by another body changes its path.

Path dependency however does not seem to follow a Newtonian physics model. Once the path is locked in, events may have little impact. In effect, it is like the cue ball striking the ball...and having no seeming effect. Rather, it seems as if the ball was following a groove in the table and the force of the cue ball was not enough to knock the ball out of the groove. However, if the cue ball does strike the ball with enough impulse (mass times velocity), it will knock it out of the groove and onto a new path. As discussed below, the collision punctuates the equilibrium.

So is logical causality different than path dependency or can they be resolved into one model? To answer that question, let us again look at the billiard table. Recall that if we understand the characteristics of the cue ball, the ball, the table and the environment, we can calculate the ball's new path after the cue ball strikes it. The “groove” is a characteristic of the table. If we understand the nature of the “groove” and the size of the billiard ball we can calculate the impulse required to knock the billiard ball out of the groove and onto a new path. Below a certain impulse, no event will cause a deviation from the grooved path. An impulse above that level will alter the path and cause a punctuated equilibrium.

The path built can get selectively constrained and reinforced through the concept of increasing returns, which are self-reinforcing or positive feedback that makes it harder for an actor to depart from a given path. When combined with path dependency theory, the two tend to show that paths that provide desired outcomes are successful and reinforce path dependent lock in (Pierson, 2000). However, as Stack and Gartland observe, a once positive path can turn sub-optimal yet be difficult to change because of lock-in. This lock-in often may only be broken by exogenous events that create a punctuated equilibrium (Spruyt, 1994 p. 23). In the social sciences, path dependency is often linked to historical institutionalism and cited as weakness of the school (Peters, et al., 2005). However, when the punctuated equilibrium effect is taken into account, the school does allow for institutional change and provides an interesting model.

Punctuated equilibrium refers to events that can significantly alter a path and cause an actor to re-evaluate policy and actions. Spruyt notes:

Change in institutions imposes costs, and hence social groups and political actors will be unwilling to experiment with new institutions unless a serious exogenous shock alters political alignments. Units will otherwise continue in the form they have taken at a particular historical juncture. Change will take the form of a punctuated equilibrium—a dramatic shift along several dimensions simultaneously in response to a powerful environmental change. (Spruyt, 1994 p. 7)

Bennet and Elman's study of path dependency is especially relevant to the case at hand. They discuss using qualitative methods to address path dependencies (Bennett, et al., 2006). They recommend a systematic set of case studies to determine path dependence. They note that since path dependency comes from economics as well as historical sociology that there are different views and definitions. They highlight four key areas, however, that seem to be common: causal possibility, contingency, closure, and constraint. The first three areas allow for multiple potential paths that can be pursued and provide for potential path changes. Constraints, however tend to lock institutions into to a specific path. This may be from increasing returns associated with the path or from norms and values that evolve within the institution that favor the given path. As noted by Hall and Taylor below, norms and values are particularly important in institutional analysis. This notion will be important as we begin to apply path dependency theory to the case at hand.

The final part of the theoretical basis in is a discussion of institutions and how they impact policy- and decision-making. As with many political science concepts, institutional theory has deep roots in economic theory, but has powerful political implications. North's influential book *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* is a key work in institutional analysis. In this book, North defines an institution as:

Institutions are the rule of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives and human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change. (North, 2007 p. 3)

Thus, for North, the institution is different than the actors. Actors may come and go within the constraints or the institution.

Ostrom, looking at institutions from a collective action perspective, has a similar definition to North's. Her path breaking book, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, defines institutions as:

"Institutions" can be defined as the sets of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions (Ostrom, 1990).

March and Olsen, looking at institutions from a behavioral perspective wrote:

From a behavioral point of view, formally organized political institutions have come to be portrayed simply as arenas within which political behavior, driven by more fundamental factors, occurs. (March, et al., 1989 p. 1)

This concept also seems to separate the actors from the arena. However, as they move away from this behaviorist aspect to a more political aspect, they do not separate the actor from the arena.

They state:

The argument that institutions can be treated as political actors is a claim of institutional coherence and autonomy. A claim of coherence is necessary if we wish to treat institutions as decision makers...

The claim of institutional autonomy is necessary to establish the fact that political institutions are more than simple mirrors of social forces. Empirical observations seem to indicate that processes internal to political institutions, although possibly triggered by external events, affect the flow of history. Programs adopted as a simple political compromise by a legislature become endowed with a separate meaning and force by having an agency established to deal with them. (March, et al., 1989 pp. 17-18)

Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor provide a solid overview of three schools of institutionalism in “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”. The work covers historical, rational-choice, and sociological institutionalism. These three schools each approach institutions from a slightly different perspective. The historical school is perhaps the most germane to our analysis based on path dependency. In general, historical institutionalists associate institutions with organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organization. (Hall, et al., 1996 p. 938). While the rational choice and sociological schools also have good points, they are less relevant to the Israeli policy analysis. Rational choice pulls from an economic basis that is similar to the new economics of the organization from which many organizational authors draw and the sociological adds additional cultural aspects to the historical school.

With the possible exception of March and Olsen, the accepted definitions of an institution focus on just the rules and not the actors and the governance processes. This artificial separation removes the governance and the evolving nature of culture and norms based upon actor evolution and interaction from the institutional model. Mahoney and Thelen observe,

...the fact that rules are not just designed but have to be applied and enforced, often by actors other than the designers, opens up a space (as both an analytic and a practical matter) for change to occur in a rule’s implementation or enactment. (Mahoney, et al., 2010)

## Model Development

Let us first work with the institutional framework. The accepted definitions of an institution focus on just the rules and not the actors and the governance processes. With this observation in





Figure 1 Institutional Model

mind, as well as Mahoney and Thelen’s observation, perhaps part of the problem lays with Ostrom’s and North’s separation of the rules from the players. This artificial separation removes the governance and norms and the effects of actor interaction from the institutional model. A more comprehensive definition is: *A system of actors, both individuals and collective groups, operating within defined constraints and structure that employs rules, and governance processes and procedures to accomplish a purpose. The structure, constraints, and rules may be created by strict design or through a process of historical path-dependency and cultural accumulation. Governance mechanisms have the capability and capacity to monitor actors, adjudicate non-compliance, and induce compliance through either inducements or compulsion.* Schematically, this definition can be represented as:

With the revised institutional model let us now start the model with Moe/McNollgast concept as a basis as shown below in Figure 4. As noted above, Moe sees and integrated approach that includes interest groups, Congress, and the President to shape and to control agencies. In his model, interest groups play a leading role, particularly through the McCubbin “fire alarms”. The model is shown in Figure 2.

The expanded institutional model takes into account the historical background, which can generate path dependencies, exogenous events, which can break path dependencies, and external actors outside of the institution that can shape policy formulation similar to interest groups. It



also reflects the electorate as a separate element. Moe implicitly includes the electorate in his model through principal-agent dynamics. While this method may work for routine issues, it may not work for more divisive and critical issues. The electorate’s wil, as expressed by public opinion, can potentially sway policy decisions apart from the congressionally based principal-agent model. This phenomenon is especially true for polarizing issues around presidential elections.




Figure 4 Structural Model

One potential issue with the model is that interest groups are included within the institutional framework. If we accept these groups as habitual actors that are bound by institutional rules and constraints, this is appropriate. If, however, these groups act outside of the rules and constraints, they need to be removed from the institution and shown as an exogenous force. Given the laws and accepted practices on lobbying in the US, approved lobby groups do fit the institutional model for policy analysis. But when we look at a group like AIPAC, however, that can take at least part of its lead from an exogenous group, perhaps interest groups can straddle the institutional boundary as shown in Figure 3 above.

### Historical Perspective

With the “special relationship” we have with Israel today, many people not realize that President




Figure 3 Modified Institutional Model

Truman was careful and deliberate about recognizing Israel in 1948. There is an interesting chronology that may surprise many people. The events below in Table 1 are representative of the key events leading up to US recognition of Israel. Many US leaders, to include the Secretary of State, did not want to recognize Israel. While Marshall grudgingly accepted Truman's decision, he had to send a senior representative to visit the US's UN delegation to keep them from resigning.

**Table 1 Key Selected Events Leading to US Recognition of Israel**

October 10, 1947: The Joint Chiefs of Staff argue in a memorandum entitled "The Problem of Palestine" that the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states would enable the Soviet Union to replace the United States and Great Britain in the region and would endanger United States access to Middle East oil.
October 17, 1947: President Truman writes to Senator Claude Pepper: "I received about 35,000 pieces of mail and propaganda from the Jews in this country while this matter [the issue of the partition of Palestine, which was being considered by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine from May 13, 1947 to August 31, 1947] was pending. I put it all in a pile and struck a match to it -- I never looked at a single one of the letters because I felt the United Nations Committee [United Nations Special Committee on Palestine] was acting in a judicial capacity and should not be interfered with."
May 12, 1948: President Truman meets in the Oval Office with Secretary of State George Marshall, Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, Counsel to the President Clark Clifford and several others to discuss the Palestine situation. Clifford argues in favor of recognizing the new Jewish state in accordance with the United Nations resolution of November 29, 1947. Marshall opposes Clifford's arguments, and contends they are based on domestic political considerations. He says that if Truman follows Clifford's advice and recognizes the Jewish state, then he (Marshall) would vote against Truman in the election. Truman does not clearly state his views in the meeting.
May 14, 1948, 6 p.m. eastern standard time (12:00 midnight in Palestine): The British mandate for Palestine expires, and the state of Israel comes into being.
May 14, 1948, 6:11 p.m. eastern standard time: The United States recognizes Israel on a de facto basis. The White House issues the following statement: "This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the provisional government thereof. The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the State of Israel."
May 14, 1948, shortly after 6:11 p.m. eastern standard time: United States representative to the United Nations Warren Austin leaves his office at the United Nations and goes home. Secretary of State Marshall sends a State Department official to the United Nations to prevent the entire United States delegation from resigning.
May 15, 1948: On May 15, 1948, the Arab states issued their response statement and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq attack Israel.

Through three Arab-Israeli wars (1948, 1956, and 1967) and numerous incidents, the relationship did not seem to change much as shown in Figure 5. The graph, however, does show a significant change starting in the early 1970's. Clarke dates the change to the September 1971 crisis between Jordan and Syria (Clarke, 1997 p. 205). While he is correct about the Syrian-Jordanian conflict which caused the US to deploy the Sixth Fleet off the coast of Syria and send the 82nd Airborne Division en-route to Syria before the crisis was resolved, the situation was actually triggered by Palestinians. The Palestinians and Jordanians engaged in a defacto civil war that left at least 3,600 and as many as 20,000 dead (Kelidar, 1973). This became known as Black September, and the terrorist group that killed the Israelis at the Munich Olympics took their

name from this event. Also, right around this time, the Palestinians started to embrace terrorism and aircraft high-jacking. They also high-jacked five aircraft in 1971.

On 4 September 1972, they attacked the Israeli Olympic team at the Munich Olympics, an event which dominated the world stage and seared images of terrorists in people's minds. As many as 800 million people followed this event in the news. (Nacos, 2003 p. 28). The world saw this and the act of terrorism and Israeli victimhood in Germany was played historically and currently. The holocaust in World War II is a powerful image that shapes and influences opinion through a sense of guilt. As a result, any criticism of Israel is almost always labeled, "anti-Semitic". This event, coupled with the 1973 Arab attack on Israel clearly punctuated the equilibrium and changed the US-Israel dynamic.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War followed a year after the Munich Massacre. This surprise attack and Israel's successful defense after near defeat in the opening part of the war again helped to etch the image of Jewish victimhood into the collective US mindset. From there, it was easy to continue to see the Israelis as heroic underdogs against vicious terrorists and totalitarian Arab regimes bent on destroying "the only democracy in the Middle East". The USG started to step up support for Israel. This support expanded even more dramatically after the 1979 Peace Accord with Egypt. From that point on, the USG guaranteed Israel a Quantitative Military Edge (QME)/ The QME was made explicit during the Reagan Administration (Wunderle, et al., 2008) and was written into law in 2008 (2011). Clarke cites a statement from Secretary of State Baker that he hoped to make it impossible for a future secretary of state, who might be less supportive of Israel, "to overcome the bureaucratic relationship between Israel and the US" created by the Reagan administration, in spite of the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and many in the Department of State questioned the value of a strong security relationship with Israel. (Clarke, 1997 p. 206) . This statement sounds similar to policy lock in that Moe and others discuss when dealing with the bureaucracy.

As Figure 5 shows, the USG significantly re-armed Israel after the 1973 war unlike the three prior wars. This trend was clearly reinforced by the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace accords. As part of this settlement, the US agreed to provide significant military aid to both Israel and Egypt.

Since then, Israeli actions demonstrate their realist bias to protect Israel at nearly any cost to rely upon military power for security and sovereignty. Israel consistently acts unilaterally when it feels there is a significant threat to its security as shown by the significant events reported in the table below.




Figure 5 US Aid to Israel

Table 2 Israeli Aggressive Actions

Israel started both 1956 War and the 1967 War. The 1956 war began when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and stopped Israeli traffic. While this action clearly violated international agreements, it does not meet the tests of Jus ad Bellum. Israel started the 1967 war with a preemptive attack. While Walzer thinks the war was just given provocative Egyptian actions (Walzer, 1977 p. 85), many others disagree.
On 7 June 1981, Israel conducted a preemptive attack on Iraqi nuclear plant to forestall nuclear weapons development.
In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon and established security zone on sovereign Lebanese territory. Israel invaded Lebanon to expel the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) after their attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom.
In 1985 Israel conducted an air raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis, violating Tunisian airspace and sovereignty.
On 6 September 2007, Israel attacked a suspected nuclear weapons development site in Syria. This attack, like the previous attack in Iraq, was designed to forestall a suspected nuclear weapons program. No proof was provided that the facility posed a threat.
In August and September 2008, Israel again invaded Lebanon to destroy Hezbollah rocket launchers and

capabilities. During the conflict, Israel killed approximately 1,000 civilians and inflicted significant damage to Lebanon and suffered significant international condemnation and an apparent military defeat (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 326). The action was largely viewed as an Israeli defeat.
December 2008 and January 2009, Israel conducted attacks on Gaza to find and destroy Hamas rocket launchers. This attack resulted in over a thousand Palestinian deaths, significant infrastructure damage, and significant international condemnation (UNSCR 1860).
In 2009 and 2010, Israel conducted multiple airstrikes in the Sudan and the Red Sea to destroy convoys they say were carrying weapons to Gaza. Israel clearly violated Sudanese sovereignty.
In May 2010, Israel aid boarded ships trying to break through the Israeli Gaza blockade and killed nine activists. Israel killed nine people and seriously damaged relations with Turkey, a one-time partner.

If we look at Jus ad Bellum (Just War Theory), Israel’s actions clearly violate major ethical constraints. The six criteria of Jus Ad Bellum are the column headers in the table below. The criteria are fairly standard to evaluate an action to see if it conforms to just war (Harbour, 1999 p. 119). I have assessed Israeli actions from the table above in conformity with established standards for the criteria.

**Table 3 Israeli Actions and Jus ad Bellum Criteria**

	Just Cause	Proper Authority	Right Intention	Probability of Success	Proportionality	Last Resort
1956 War	No	No	no	Yes	No	No
1967 War	Yes	No	No	Uncertain	Yes	No
1981 Iraqi bombing	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
1982 Lebanon Invasion	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
1985 PLO attack	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
2007 Syria bombing	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
2008 Lebanon attack	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
2008 Gaza attack	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
2010 blockade boarding	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
2012 Gaza bombing	Uncertain	No	No	No	No	No

So why does the USG consistently support Israel and shelter it from harsh international sanctions? Mearsheimer and Walt date this strong, “special relationship” to the Reagan administration (Mearsheimer, et al., 2007 p. 34). However, they may be off on their date by about a decade as shown in the punctuated equilibrium analysis above. The USG has now invested so much money and creditability in Israel that it will be very difficult to pull back from this special relationship. In effect, we have created a path dependency that only another punctuated equilibrium brought on by a significant endogenous event may break. The “groove” of the path is significant since none of the events in Table 3 had enough impulse to puncture the equilibrium and start a new path. Why?

## The Israel Lobby and its Effects

Mearsheimer and Walt think it is because of the power of the Pro-Israel Lobby. The Pro-Israel lobby has two distinct wings that do not always see eye-to-eye. One wing is the traditional Jewish perspective represented by AIPAC. The other wing, representing nearly half the total lobby, are conservative Christians that see a “biblical imperative” to support Israel. The founder of J-Street, a more liberal Jewish lobby effort, notes this conservative Christian wing is one reason he founded J-street (Ben-Ami, 2008). At times there is an uneasy alliance between the two groups. To date, the Christian groups have tended to ignore the Israeli human rights and justice issues and focus on their “biblical imperative” (Bach, 2010). If this changes and the Christians see Israel as an apartheid state, we may see a break in the lobby.

If Mearsheimer and Walt are correct, then there should be a high correlation between the Pro-Israel PAC contributions and Congressional bills and policy. They insist that the reported PAC contributions do not reflect the entire power of the “Israel Lobby”, as they do not reflect soft dollars and individual contributions. They note a Washington Post estimate that 60% of all democratic presidential candidate contributions come from aspects of the “Israel Lobby”, but other estimates range between 20%-59% (Mearsheimer, et al., 2009 p. 266). Since these are hard to measure and best guesses, I will use the reported PAC data.

The PAC data for election cycles 1998-2010 is shown below. Additional data, going back to the 93<sup>rd</sup> Congress is also used to show the overall trend of Israel related bills. Bill data is from GovTrack (Sea12). The PAC data is from OpenSecrets.org (Pro12). The Pro-Israel PACs contains PACs that may have interests besides Israel, so if anything, the PAC data may somewhat overestimate the pro-Israel lobby efforts. Likewise, the Israel Bills can contain a mixture of anything from a passed bill to a resolution. Resolutions can be anything from an immigration issue to a significant issue such as the Goldstone Report on the Gaza conflict.

**Table 4 Pro-Israel PAC and Bills**

Year	Israel PAC \$	Israel Bills
1998	\$ 2,102,906	14
2000	\$ 1,902,904	17
2002	\$ 2,727,689	20
2004	\$ 3,142,494	19
2006	\$ 3,029,293	31
2008	\$ 3,138,427	31
2010	\$ 2,962,520	29




Figure 6 Israel Related Bills in Congress

Let us now look at the Pro-Israel PAC contributions.




Figure 7 Pro-Israel PAC Contributions




Figure 8 Israel PAC Contributions and Israeli Related Bills as a Percentage of Total PAC Contributions and Bills

### Data Analysis

The data in Table 4 has a correlation factor of .73408636, an R2 of .538882784, and P-value of .06032. These measures, especially the P-value, do indicate a significant correlation between Pro-Israel PAC contributions and Israel related bills. However, if we look at the graph in Figure 6, we can see a correlation between spikes in Israel related bills and Israel-related incidents. The inflection points in the graph are highly correlated to incidents. This tends to confirm the path dependency that we saw in the funding graph and the Thomas' idea that USG policy is triggered by Israeli-related events. It does not support Mearsheimer and Walt's thesis that the Israel Lobby controls US policy. Does the same hold for individual members of Congress?

If we look at the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, there were 29 Israel related bills. One representative, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [R-FL18], introduced 3 of them. She was the fourth largest recipient of Pro-Israel PAC money at \$147,207 in 2010. The Pro-Israel PAC was by far her largest donor. This is curious to say the least, since she is a Republican. However, of the remaining 26 bills, 4 others were sponsored by someone in the top 20 recipients of Israeli PAC contributions in either the House or Senate. So what were these bills?

Table 5 2010 Bills with a Top 20 Recipient Sponsor

Bill	Sponsor	Key Issue/Importance
H.Con.Res. 260 (111th): Recognizing the 62nd anniversary of the independence of the State of Israel, and reaffirming unequivocal support for the alliance and friendship between the United States and Israel.	Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [R-FL18]	Symbolic show of support at a critical juncture. Many co-sponsors. Referred to Committee and died
S. 3451 (111th): United States-Israel Rocket and Missile Defense Cooperation and Support Act	Sen. Barbara Boxer [D-CA]	Provide funding for a key Israeli program

		Died after introduction
S.Res. 10 (111th): A resolution recognizing the right of Israel to defend itself against attacks from Gaza and reaffirming the United States' strong support for Israel in its battle with Hamas, and supporting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.	Sen. Harry Reid [D-NV]	Expresses commitment to the welfare and survival of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state with secure borders and recognizes Israel's right to act in self-defense Passed (Simple resolution)
H.Res. 34 (111th): Recognizing Israel's right to defend itself against attacks from Gaza, reaffirming the United States' strong support for Israel, and supporting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.	Rep. Nancy Pelosi [D-CA8]	Expresses commitment to the welfare and survival of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state with secure borders and recognizes Israel's right to act in self-defense Passed (Simple resolution)
H.Con.Res. 315 (111th): Recognizing the formation and supporting the objectives of the Friends of Israel Initiative.	Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [R-FL18]	Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state Referred to committee and died
H.Res. 1391 (111th): Congratulating Israel for its accession to membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.	Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [R-FL18]	Congratulates Israel and acknowledges the US role in Israel's acceptance. Passed simple resolution
H.Res. 1751 (111th): Mourning the loss of life and expressing condolences to the families affected by the tragic forest fire in Israel that began on December 2, 2010.	Rep. Ron Klein [D-FL22, 2007-2010]	Simple affirmation of support Passed simple resolution

From both a statistical and a qualitative perspective, there does not seem to be much of a linkage between Pro-Israel PAC contributions and substantive support for Israel. Most of these were not very important and none of them became law or resulted in a policy shift or additional grants to Israel.

Did congressional or other pressures lead to US vetoes of UNSC resolutions? Mearsheimer and




Figure 10 US United Nations Vetoes of Israel Related Resolutions

Walt at least implicitly link Israel Lobby pressure to the vetoes. If, however, we look at the pattern of the vetoes shown below in Figure 10 and the detail in Appendix B, there is no discernible linkage. Rather, the events appear to be event driven as clearly shown in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon the first time.

### **Controlling the Terms of the Debate**

The area in which the Pro-Israel Lobby may be successful is controlling the terms of the debate.

Clarke, in an analysis of Egyptian and Israeli aid, states:

Israeli analyst Shai Feldman concurs: "[T]he strategic dimension of America's motivation for supporting Israel never comprised the core of these relations. Rather.. 'softer' value-based considerations and the nature of American domestic politics combined to play a much more important role ..." (Clarke, 1997 p. 207)

Two images of Israel, victimhood and beleaguered democracy, are etched into the American psyche and control the debate. This is very much in keeping with Andrews and Edwards model as well as McCubbin's fire alarm. This is where the Pro-Israel Lobby is powerful. However, this power is more prophylactic than formative and causative. Events seem to drive actual USG actions and the Pro-Israeli Lobby works to maintain the path and prevent punctuation.

Thouin, commenting on the 2010 AIPAC conference, notes that:

The overall conference theme, "Israel: Tell the Story," represented AIPAC's effort to redirect the increasingly negative public narrative on Israel that has emerged since Israel's winter 2008–2009 assault on Gaza. This was part of a broader attempt to shift from a defensive campaign aimed at refuting criticism of Israel to an offensive campaign focused on advancing a positive picture of Israel, that of "an innovator, a Jewish homeland, an open society, a light unto the nations." AIPAC executive director Howard Kohr outlined in broad strokes the new strategy, expressly calling on his audience to shed their "defensive mentality," which he argued focused "all too often on the slights Israel faces," and instead "tell the story of Israel's hand extended in peace . . . Israel's example of freedom and democracy." (Thouin, 2010)

On the other side, the Arabs have been singularly unsuccessful in setting the terms of the debate and changing the American psyche to date. However, as Mearsheimer and Walt note, "a 2005 survey by the Anti-Defamation League found that 78 percent of Americans believe that Washington should favor neither Israel nor the Palestinians" (Mearsheimer, et al., 2009 p. 265). If the Arabs can eschew terrorism and gain their voice, the Pro-Israeli Lobby may no longer be able to control the terms of debate.

### **The Presidency**

Presidents have been the principle institutional actor in US policy to Israel and the Middle East. In a sense, this is no surprise. As Lewis notes, foreign affairs is perhaps the arena that presidents have the most power. Presidents since Jimmy Carter seemed to be obsessed with being the president that solves the Gordian Knot of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Perhaps the single

biggest legacy of the Carter administration was the Camp David Accords that resulted in the peace settlement between Israel and Egypt. Reagan significantly elevated Israeli importance, even over the objections of senior advisors (Clarke, 1997 p. 206). However, Reagan did sell AWACS to the Saudi's over the objectives of Israel and the pro-Israeli lobby (Bard, 1988). George H. B. Bush likewise provided Israel aid to remain on the sidelines of the Persian Gulf War and then sought to use his success to drive home a peace. Bill Clinton spent his last days in the presidency scampering to broker a peace settlement, again to no avail (Quandt, 2001). George W. Bush likewise spent a great deal of attention on Israel. Barack Obama has followed suit.

Obama's administration may show a great deal about the interplay between the Pro-Israeli Lobby, Israel, and USG institutional actors. Israel seemingly deliberately insulted the US when it announced a new settlement during the vice president's visit. This action seemed like it could be the punctuated equilibrium event that changed the course of US-Israeli relations. But it did not happen. Relations seemed to cool for a bit, but aid never stopped and Obama came back eventually attesting to the strength of the special relationship. Congressmen, the president and Secretary of State all attended the AIPAC conference. Pundits speculated that the Pro-Israeli lobby called Obama's bluff and threatened to withdraw support if he did not toe the line.

This series of events seems to show the power that Mearsheim and Walt discuss. But looked at in a different light, it may actually show something quite different. Israel's main intent may simply be to keep the peace process an open issue, seemingly so close to a resolution, but never quite there. The peace process is perhaps the main factor that now sustains the path. Presidents want to be the president that finally unties the knot. Once the knot is untied, future presidents may have limited interest in maintaining the current path. A peace settlement could be the punctuation event that ends the path and perhaps the Israeli's understand this very well. Thus, perhaps the real clout is not so much the threat of withdrawn Jewish support for re-election, but rather the continued dangled hope of being the president that finally brings peace. In this series of events, Israel dealt a blow to the peace process and then was able to maintain the path.

Is the Pro-Israeli lobby doing more than simply fighting a rear guard effort to prevent a punctuated equilibrium event? While written in 1978, Trice's observation that only rarely do interest groups affect foreign policy is still relevant (Trice, 1978 pp. 238-239). His observations may be especially relevant as they reflect public opinion polls before the Egypt-Israeli peace and before most of the current controversy. He notes that indirect methods such as interest groups using public opinion to affect policy must take a circuitous route. He states, "A consistent finding among analytical studies of the pro-Israel movement is that, with relatively few but major exceptions (particularly arms sales to Israel), these groups have had little direct impact on American Middle East policy." (Trice, 1978 p. 240) Writing ten years later, at the end of the Reagan administration, Bard echoed these comments (Bard, 1988). The current findings tend to confirm that Trice Bard's observations are still accurate.

## Putting it together

If we now return to Figure 3, we can see that all of the principal entities in the model do apply. The interest groups in the form of the Pro-Israel lobby shape the terms of the debate. Congress controls the levels of foreign aid, and the president sets the overall policy and agenda. However, they all operate within the constraints of path dependency. The historical events shown on the left of Figure 3 have created a deep groove that will require significant impulse to alter. Even internationally condemned events such as the Gaza incursion and the attack on Lebanon have not had enough impulse to alter the path. Indeed, the path is so strong the US has stood alone to support Israel numerous times and actually increased aid in response to some of these events. If the Arabs and the Palestinians had a stronger lobby and broke their implicit connection between them and terrorism, they may change the path dynamics. Likewise if the two wings of the Pro-Israeli are sundered, the path dynamics could change.

## Conclusions

Neither qualitative nor quantitative analysis shows a direct causal link between Pro-Israel lobbyist PAC contributions and USG actions and policy. Rather USG actions and policy seem to be bound to Israel through path dependency and events on the ground. Until there is an endogenous event that punctuates the equilibrium, this path dependency will govern the relationship.

The pro-Israel Lobby's ability to control the debate is the primary constraint that defines the institutional structure of US-Israel relations. It implicitly sets the rules and norms that permit or inhibit action. But it is based on the historical path between the two states, largely based on terrorism, rather than current reality. Thus only an endogenous event will break these constraints.

Current events may eventually surpass history. As the Israeli Arab population continues to grow faster than the Jewish population and Israel continues to occupy a growing Palestinian population, the "democratic" part of a "Jewish democracy" may become a fiction. At some point, this will create a tipping point that breaks the path dependency. One day, perhaps, an Arab lobby group will effectively start pulling fire alarms.

## Appendix A Israel Related Bills in the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress

H.R. 5327 (111th): United States-Israel Rocket and Missile Defense Cooperation and Support Act

Sponsor: Rep. Glenn Nye [D-VA2, 2009-2010]

Introduced: May 18, 2010

Passed House: May 20, 2010

H.R. 4046 (111th): To enhance the reporting requirements on the status of the Arab League trade boycott of Israel and other trade boycotts of Israel.

Sponsor: Rep. Shelley Berkley [D-NV1]

Introduced: Nov 06, 2009

Referred to Committee: Nov 06, 2009

S. 1671 (111th): A bill to enhance the reporting requirements on the status of the Arab League trade boycott of Israel and other trade boycotts of Israel.

Sponsor: Sen. Lindsey Graham [R-SC]

Introduced: Sep 15, 2009

H.Con.Res. 260 (111th): Recognizing the 62nd anniversary of the independence of the State of Israel, and reaffirming unequivocal support for the alliance and friendship between the United States and Israel.

**Sponsor: Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [R-FL18] Top 20 House**

Introduced: Apr 13, 2010

Referred to Committee: Apr 13, 2010

H.R. 3160 (111th): Israel Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, 2010

Sponsor: Rep. Christopher “Chris” Smith [R-NJ4]

Introduced: Jul 09, 2009

Referred to Committee: Jul 09, 2009

S. 3451 (111th): United States-Israel Rocket and Missile Defense Cooperation and Support Act

**Sponsor: Sen. Barbara Boxer [D-CA] Top 20 Senate**

Introduced: May 27, 2010

S.Res. 10 (111th): A resolution recognizing the right of Israel to defend itself against attacks from Gaza and reaffirming the United States’ strong support for Israel in its battle with Hamas, and supporting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

**Sponsor: Sen. Harry Reid [D-NV] Top 20 Senate**

Introduced: Jan 08, 2009

Passed (Simple Resolution): Jan 08, 2009

S.Res. 6 (111th): A resolution expressing solidarity with Israel in Israel’s defense against terrorism in the Gaza Strip.

Sponsor: Sen. David Vitter [R-LA]

Introduced: Jan 06, 2009

Referred to Committee: Jan 06, 2009

H.Res. 37 (111th): Condemning Hamas for the recent attacks against Israel.

Sponsor: Rep. Michael "Mike" Rogers [R-AL3]

Introduced: Jan 09, 2009

Referred to Committee: Jan 09, 2009

H.Res. 1277 (111th): Commending the efforts and honoring the work of the State of Israel, the Israel Defense Forces, and the Israeli people for their coordinated efforts to save lives and provide relief to the people of Haiti in the aftermath of the devas

Sponsor: Rep. Henry "Hank" Johnson [D-GA4]

Introduced: Apr 20, 2010

Referred to Committee: Apr 20, 2010

H.Res. 1599 (111th): Reaffirming support for Israel as a longtime friend, ally, and strategic partner of the United States and Israel's right to defend itself.

Sponsor: Rep. Carolyn McCarthy [D-NY4]

Introduced: Jul 30, 2010

Referred to Committee: Jul 30, 2010

H.Res. 1191 (111th): Urging the expedient relocation of the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

Sponsor: Rep. Doug Lamborn [R-CO5]

Introduced: Mar 18, 2010

Referred to Committee: Mar 18, 2010

H.Res. 34 (111th): Recognizing Israel's right to defend itself against attacks from Gaza, reaffirming the United States' strong support for Israel, and supporting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

**Sponsor: Rep. Nancy Pelosi [D-CA8] Top 20 House**

Introduced: Jan 08, 2009

Passed (Simple Resolution): Jan 09, 2009

H.Con.Res. 111 (111th): Recognizing the 61st anniversary of the independence of the State of Israel.

Sponsor: Rep. Scott Garrett [R-NJ5]

Introduced: Apr 28, 2009

Passed House: May 04, 2009

H.Res. 282 (111th): Recognizing the 30th anniversary of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Sponsor: Rep. Jeffrey Fortenberry [R-NE1]

Introduced: Mar 24, 2009

Passed (Simple Resolution): Mar 31, 2009

H.Con.Res. 315 (111th): Recognizing the formation and supporting the objectives of the Friends of Israel Initiative.

**Sponsor: Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [R-FL18] Top 20 House**

Introduced: Sep 14, 2010

Referred to Committee: Sep 14, 2010

H.R. 4406 (111th): To render nationals of Israel eligible to enter the United States as nonimmigrant traders and investors.

Sponsor: Rep. Anthony Weiner [D-NY9, 1999-2011]

Introduced: Dec 16, 2009

Referred to Committee: Dec 16, 2009

H.Res. 1391 (111th): Congratulating Israel for its accession to membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

**Sponsor: Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [R-FL18] Top 20 House**

Introduced: May 25, 2010

Passed (Simple Resolution): May 28, 2010

H.R. 3412 (111th): Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition Act of 2009

Sponsor: Rep. Dan Burton [R-IN5]

Introduced: Jul 30, 2009

Referred to Committee: Jul 30, 2009

H.Res. 1751 (111th): Mourning the loss of life and expressing condolences to the families affected by the tragic forest fire in Israel that began on December 2, 2010.

**Sponsor: Rep. Ron Klein [D-FL22, 2007-2010] Top 20 House**

Introduced: Dec 07, 2010

Passed (Simple Resolution): Dec 07, 2010

H.R. 5501 (111th): America Stands with Israel Act

Sponsor: Rep. Peter "Pete" King [R-NY3]

Introduced: Jun 10, 2010

Referred to Committee: Jun 10, 2010

H.Res. 1241 (111th): Supporting the right of Israel to defend itself against terrorists and the Israeli construction of new security fences along the border of Egypt.

Sponsor: Rep. Scott Garrett [R-NJ5]

Introduced: Apr 13, 2010

Referred to Committee: Apr 13, 2010

H.Res. 511 (111th): Commending efforts to teach the history of both Israelis and Palestinians to students in Israel and the West Bank in order to foster mutual understanding, respect, and tolerance.

Sponsor: Rep. James "Jim" Moran [D-VA8]

Introduced: Jun 04, 2009

Referred to Committee: Jun 04, 2009

S.Res. 548 (111th): A resolution to express the sense of the Senate that Israel has an undeniable right to self-defense, and to condemn the recent destabilizing actions by extremists aboard the ship Mavi Marmara.

Sponsor: Sen. John Cornyn [R-TX]

Introduced: Jun 09, 2010

Passed (Simple Resolution): Jun 24, 2010

S. 2737 (111th): Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Act of 2009  
Sponsor: Sen. Samuel "Sam" Brownback [R-KS, 1996-2010]  
Introduced: Nov 05, 2009

H.Res. 1553 (111th): Expressing support for the State of Israel's right to defend Israeli sovereignty, to protect the lives and safety of the Israeli people, and to use all means necessary to confront and eliminate nuclear threats posed by the Islamic Rep  
Sponsor: Rep. Louis Gohmert [R-TX1]  
Introduced: Jul 22, 2010  
Referred to Committee: Jul 22, 2010

H.Res. 1532 (111th): Urging an investigation into the role of the Insan Hak ve Hurriyetleri ve Insani Yardim Vakfi in providing financial, logistical, and material support to terrorists, and into the role of any foreign governments, including the Republic  
Sponsor: Rep. Dina Titus [D-NV3, 2009-2010]  
Introduced: Jul 15, 2010  
Referred to Committee: Jul 15, 2010

H.Res. 1440 (111th): Recognizing and supporting Israel's right to defend itself.  
Sponsor: Rep. Anthony Weiner [D-NY9, 1999-2011]  
Introduced: Jun 14, 2010  
Referred to Committee: Jun 14, 2010

H.Res. 557 (111th): Expressing support for the State of Israel's inalienable right to defend itself in the face of an imminent nuclear or military threat from Iran, terrorist organizations, and the countries that harbor them.  
Sponsor: Rep. Peter "Pete" Sessions [R-TX32]  
Introduced: Jun 18, 2009  
Referred to Committee: Jun 18, 2009

## Append B US Vetoes of UN Resolutions Critical of Israel

(1972-2011) (Jewish Virtual Library, 2011)

### Vetoes: 1972-1982

Subject	Date & Meeting	US Rep Casting Veto	Vote
Palestine: Syrian-Lebanese Complaint. 3 power draft resolution 2/10784	9/10/1972	Bush	13-1, 1
Palestine: Examination of Middle East Situation. 8-power draft resolution (S/10974)	7/2/1973	Scali	13-1, 0 (China not partic.)
Palestine: Egyptian-Lebanese Complaint. 5-power draft power resolution (S/11898)	12/8/1975	Moynihan	13-1, 1
Palestine: Middle East Problem, including Palestinian question. 6-power draft resolution (S/11940)	1/26/1976	Moynihan	9-1,3 (China & Libya not partic.)
Palestine: Situation in Occupied Arab Territories. 5-power draft resolution (S/12022)	3/25/1976	Scranton	14-1,0
Palestine: Report on Committee on Rights of Palestinian People. 4-power draft resolution (S/121119)	6/29/1976	Sherer	10-1,4
Palestine: Palestinian Rights. Tunisian draft resolution. (S/13911)	4/30/1980	McHenry	10-1,4
Palestine: Golan Heights. Jordan draft resolution. (S/14832/Rev. 2)	1/20/1982	Kirkpatrick	9-1,5
Palestine: Situation in Occupied Territories, Jordan draft resolution	4/2/1982	Lichenstein	13-1,1

(S/14943)			
Palestine: Incident at the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. 4-power draft resolution	4/20/1982	Kirpatrick	14-1, 0
Palestine: Conflict in Lebanon. Spain draft resolution. (S/15185)	6/8/1982	Kirpatrick	14-1,0
Palestine: Conflict in Lebanon. France draft resolution. (S/15255/Rev. 2)	6/26/1982	Lichenstein	14-1
Palestine: Conflict in Lebanon. USSR draft resolution. (S/15347/Rev. 1, as orally amended)	8/6/1982	Lichenstein	11-1,3
Palestine: Situation in Occupied Territories, 20-power draft resolution (S/15895)	8/2/1983	Lichenstein	13-1,1

### Security Council Vetoes/Negative voting 1983-present

Subject	Date	Vote
Occupied Arab Territories: Wholesale condemnation of Israeli settlement policies - not adopted	1983	
S. Lebanon: Condemns Israeli action in southern Lebanon. S/16732	9/6/1984	Vetoed: 13-1 (US), with 1 abstention (UK)
Occupied Territories: Deplors "repressive measures" by Israel against Arab population. S/19459.	9/13/1985	Vetoed: 10-1 (US), with 4 abstentions (Australia, Denmark, UK, France)
Lebanon: Condemns Israeli practices against civilians in southern Lebanon. S/17000.	3/12/1985	Vetoed: 11-1 (US), with 3 abstentions (Australia,

		Denmark, UK)
Occupied Territories: Calls upon Israel to respect Muslim holy places. S/17769/Rev. 1	1/30/1986	Vetoed: 13-1 (US), with one abstention (Thailand)
Lebanon: Condemns Israeli practices against civilians in southern Lebanon. S/17730/Rev. 2.	1/17/1986	Vetoed: 11-1 (US), with 3 abstentions (Australia, Denmark, UK)
Libya/Israel: Condemns Israeli interception of Libyan plane. S/17796/Rev. 1.	2/6/1986	Vetoed: 10 -1 (US), with 4 abstentions (Australia, Denmark, France, UK)
Lebanon: Draft strongly deplored repeated Israeli attacks against Lebanese territory and other measures and practices against the civilian population; (S/19434)	1/18/1988	Vetoed 13-1 (US), with 1 abstention (UK)
Lebanon: Draft condemned recent invasion by Israeli forces of Southern Lebanon and repeated a call for the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanese territory; (S/19868)	5/10/1988	Vetoed 14-1 (US)
Lebanon: Draft strongly deplored the recent Israeli attack against Lebanese territory on 9 December 1988; (S/20322)	12/14/1988	Vetoed 14-1 (US)
Occupied territories: Draft called on Israel to accept de jure applicability of the 4th Geneva Convention; (S/19466)	1988	Vetoed 14-1 (US)
Occupied territories: Draft urged Israel to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention, rescind the order to deport Palestinian civilians, and condemned policies and practices of Israel that violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories; (S/19780)	1988	Vetoed 14-1 (US)

Occupied territories: Strongly deplored Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories, and strongly deplored also Israel's continued disregard of relevant Security Council decisions.	2/17/1989	Vetoed 14-1 (US)
Occupied territories: Condemned Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories.	6/9/1989	Vetoed 14-1 (US)
Occupied territories: Deplored Israel's policies and practices in the occupied territories.	11/7/1989	Vetoed 14-1 (US)
<a href="#">Occupied territories: NAM draft resolution to create a commission and send three security council members to Rishon Lezion, where an Israeli gunmen shot down seven Palestinian workers.</a>	5/31/1990	Vetoed 14-1 (US)
<a href="#">Middle East: Confirms that the expropriation of land by Israel in East Jerusalem is invalid and in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions and provisions of the Fourth Geneva convention; expresses support of peace process, including the Declaration of Principles of 9/13/1993</a>	5/17/1995	Vetoed 14-1 (US)
<a href="#">Middle East: Calls upon Israeli authorities to refrain from all actions or measures, including settlement activities.</a>	3/7/1997	Vetoed 14-1 (US)
<a href="#">Middle East: Demands that Israel cease construction of the settlement in east Jerusalem (called Jabal Abu Ghneim by the Palestinians and Har Homa by Israel), as well as all the other Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories</a>	3/21/1997	Vetoed 13-1,1 (US)
<a href="#">Call for UN Observers Force in West Bank, Gaza</a>	3/27/2001	Vetoed 9-1 (US), with four abstentions (Britain, France, Ireland and Norway)
<a href="#">Condemned acts of terror, demanded an end to</a>	12/14/2001	Vetoed 12-1 (US)

<a href="#">violence and the establishment of a monitoring mechanism to bring in observers.</a>		with two abstentions (Britain and Norway)
<a href="#">On the killing by Israeli forces of several UN employees and the destruction of the World Food Programme (WFP) warehouse</a>	12/19/2002	12-1 (US) with two abstentions (Bulgaria and Cameroon)
<a href="#">Demand that Israel halt threats to expel Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat</a>	9/16/2003	Vetoed 11-1 (US) with three abstentions (Britain, Germany and Bulgaria)
<a href="#">Seeks to bar Israel from extending security fence</a>	10/14/2003	Vetoed 10-1 with four abstentions (Britain, Germany, Bulgaria and Cameroon)
<a href="#">Condemns Israel for killing Ahmed Yassin</a>	3/25/2004	Vetoed 11-1 (US) with three abstentions (Britain, Germany, Romania)
<a href="#">Calls For Israel To Halt Gaza Operation</a>	10/05/2004	Vetoed 11-1 (US) with three abstentions (Britain, Germany, Romania)
<a href="#">Calls For Israel To Halt Gaza Operation</a>	7/13/2006	Vetoed 10-1 (US) with four abstentions ( <a href="#">Britain</a> , <a href="#">Peru</a> , <a href="#">Denmark</a> and

		<a href="#">Slovakia</a> )
<a href="#">Calls For Israel To Halt Gaza Operation</a>	11/11/2006	Vetoed 10-1 (US) with four absentations (Britain, Denmark, Japan and Slovakia)
<a href="#">Condemns all Israeli settlements established since 1967 as illegal and calls for an immediate halt to all settlement building</a>	2/18/2011	Vetoed 14-1 (US)

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